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Interest Rates and Economic
Announcements
HE ANNOUNCEMENT of some government
statistic, like the latest unemployment rate or
the nation’s most recent trade balance, often is
used as the rationale for observed changes in
financial markets that day. One reporter, for ex-
ample, suggests that
[iln the early 1980s, investors were overly con-
cerned with credit and monetary figures, focusing
on Federal Reserve data. These days, professionals
are preoccupied with inflation, the dollar and the
health of the economy.’
Another reporter points out the unsystematic
nature of such interpretations with the wry
comment that
[tihe trade deficit doesn’t matter as much any
more. At least, not to the stock market. At least
not this month.’
Do announcements of government statistics
systematically affect financial markets? There is
a substantial literature on the relationship be-
tween interest rates and stock prices and an-
nouncements of the money stock. Overall, this
evidence supports the conclusion that announce-
ments of the money stock had an important in-
fluence on interest rates in the early 1980s.’
This influence arose when the Federal Reserve
first announced in October 1979 that it would
use the money stock as a target for monetary
policy, then largely disappeared in 1982 and
1983 when the Federal Reserve moved away
from monetary aggregate targeting.~
Existing studies of the relationship between
interest rates or stock prices and announce-
ments of other economic data find little
evidence that either is affected by these an-
nouncements. For example, Pearce and Roley
(1985) investigate the effect of unexpected
changes in inflation and real activity on stock
prices and find little response of stock prices.
Hardouvelis (1987) examines this relationship for
interest rates and stock prices and finds that
they are systematically affected only by an-
nouncements of the money stock.
One common aspect of these studies is that
they examine subperiods associated with
changes in monetary policy. Changes in policy
regimes provide an obvious basis on which to
expect changes in the effect of money stock an-
nouncements on financial markets. There is no
obvious reason, however, for changes in the ef-
‘Wallace (1988).
‘Sease (1989).
‘This is less obvious for stock prices. As Thornton (1989)
has demonstrated, money announcements are not suffi-
ciently important for stock prices to be reliably associated
with changes in the money stock.
4See Gilbert (1985) and Thornton (1988) for a discussion of
the changes in operating procedures.
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fects of announcements of other economic data
to occur only when the Federal Reserve changes
operating procedures.’ It is quite possible that a
temporal association between interest rates or
stock prices and the announcement of a par-
ticular statistic is fleeting compared to estimates
based on multi-year sample periods of about
three years.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
temporal response of short- and long-term in-
terest rates to announcements of certain key
government statistics. Unlike previous studies,
we do not constrain the investigation by using
only time periods of alternative monetary policy
operating procedures. Rather, we attempt to
determine whether the different announce-
ments vary in importance over different time
periods, even as short as one year.
MONEY, INFLATION AND REAL
ACTIVITY
We examine the relationship between changes
in interest rates and announcements using re-
gressions that can be written as
(1) AR, = a + flU, + 8,
where AR, is the change in the interest rate in
period t, U is a vector of the unexpected parts
of the announcements of some government
statistics, ~, is the error term, and a and j3 de-
note the set of parameters to be estimated. We
focus on the unexpected parts of the announce-
ments because, when the change in the price of
an asset like Treasury securities or stocks is
measured over a short period, the change in the
asset’s price may be affected only by the unex-
pected part of the announcement.’ For the most
part, previous empirical analyses indicate that
changes in interest rates are systematically
associated only with the unexpected part of
weekly announcements of the money stock.~In
addition to the money stock announcements, we
study the effects of announcements of inflation,
real economic activity and the trade balance.
We examine the effects on both short- and
long-term interest rates. Under the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure, any differen-
tial response of interest rates reflects differen-
ces in the impact of the unexpected change in
economic variables on current and predicted
future short-term interest rates.’ If the expected
change in money, inflation, industrial produc-
tion, etc., is partly transitory, then the effect on
the current short-term rate will be larger than
on the long-term rate.’
Unexpected MOneY
The evidence in previous studies clearly in-
dicates that the relationship between changes in
interest rates and the unexpected part of the
money announcement in the early 1980s is posi-
tive. There are three possible explanations for
this association: an “expected liquidity” effect;
an “expected inflation” effect; and a “real
economic activity” effect.’°
‘Using only these periods to look for changes in the effect
of announcements on financial markets becomes increas-
ingly implausible as the changes in operating procedures
become more distant in the past.
‘The lack of generality of the proposition that asset prices
are affected only by the unexpected part of announce-
ments is made by, among others, LeRoy (1982), especially
pp. 205-08. It can, however, be justified as an approxima-
tion (Sims, 1984). The extension to interest rates, an in-
verse function of the price, can be justified as an
approximation.
7Some have found that the expected component of the
change in money also exerts a statistically significant ef-
fect on changes in interest rates. See, for example, Hem
(1985) and Belongia and Sheehan (1987). Several studies
have shown, however, that such results may stem from
certain anomalies in the data. For example, Belongia,
Hafer and Sheehan (1986) find that the significance of ex-
pected changes in money stems from one observation in
which a benchmark revision in the data coincided with a
so-called Social Security week. The removal of this obser-
vation reduces expected money’s coefficient to statistical
insignificance. Other researchers, for example, Clark, et al.
(1988), also have argued that the inclusion of Social
Security weeks leads to the spurious result that expected
changes in money influence interest rate changes. For a
discussion ofthe effects of Social Security weeks on the
observed changes in money, see Hafer (1984).
‘The evidence in Flavin (1984) and Campbell and Shiller
(1987), for example, indicates that the expectations
hypothesis accounts for much of the variation of long-term
interest rates relative to short-term rates.
‘Under the expectations hypothesis of the term structure,
the change in the long-term interest rate is the sum of the
discounted change in expected future interest rates, a
term due to the return from holding the bond and terms
due to the expected short-term rates appearing in one but
not the other bond. See Flavin (1984), p. 231. If the coeffi-
cient relating the changes in expected interest rates to the
unexpected part of the announcement decreases with term
to maturity, then the usual algebra indicates that the
response will be less for long-term interest rates.
“Cornell (1983) and Sheehan (1985) discuss these explana-
tions and provide useful surveys of the evidence.
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The expected liquidity effect is based on the
supposition that a larger forecast error is asso-
ciated with an expectation that the Federal
Reserve will engage in more contractionary
open market operations in the near future
relative to what they would have done other-
wise. As a result of the expected contractionary
open market operations, near-term interest
rates increase. The expectation of higher in-
terest rates in the near future, though, raises
current rates to maturity on securities that ma-
ture after the expected contractionary open
market operations.” An unexpected increase in
the money stock is thus associated with an in-
crease in interest rates.
An alternative explanation can be cast in
terms of expected inflation. Under this explana-
tion, an unexpected increase in money leads
economic agents to revise their expectations of
future inflation upward. Because nominal inter-
est rates are the sum of the real interest rate
and the expected inflation rate, an unexpected
increase in expected inflation, ceteris paribus,
leads to an increase in nominal interest rates.
The real economic activity effect predicts that
interest rates will respond positively to an unex-
pected money increase. According to this ex-
planation, the money announcement reveals in-
formation about money demand in the econ-
omy. If the announced stock of money depends
on the demand for money, an announced
money stock greater than expected indicates
that money demand is greater than expected. If
the demand for money depends, among other
things, on expectations of future real economic
activity, an unexpected increase in the money
stock reflects an increase in expected real activi-
ty.12 Because economic activity and real interest
rates are positively correlated, an unexpected
increase in the money stock is associated with
an increase in real and nominal interest rates.
Unexpected Iratian
Whether announcements of inflation are
related to changes in interest rates due to an ef-
fect on expected monetary policy or expected
inflation, an announcement that inflation is
greater than expected can result in an increase
in interest rates. If an announcement of infla-
tion greater than expected for the recent period
increases expected future inflation, there is a
direct effect on the nominal interest rate. On
the other hand, with a goal of lower inflation,
the Federal Reserve may be expected to offset
the higher inflation (or the perception of higher
future inflation) by a more restrictive monetary
policy. In either case, an unexpected increase in
inflation increases nominal interest rates. As for
the money stock, the relative effect on short-
term and long-term rates reflects how perma-
nent the change in inflation is expected to be.
The more transitory it is, the smaller the
relative effect on long-term rates.
Real Activity
An unexpected increase in real activity raises
nominal interest rates through two channels.
One is from agents’ revised expectations that
future real activity will be higher, thus causing
expected real interest rates and, hence, nominal
rates to increase. The other is from the ex-
pected reaction of the Federal Reserve. If
economic agents expect the Fed to tighten
monetary policy on news of stronger future
economic growth, then interest rates can in-
crease because of the expected liquidity effect.
Trade Balance
The trade balance is exports minus imports.
When exports are less than imports, the trade
balance is negative, a situation that character-
izes most of the 1980s. An announcement of a
larger-than-expected trade balance can increase
or decrease nominal interest rates. A larger
trade balance today is associated with larger
trade balances in the future.13 Even with this
qualification, however, the effect of announce-
ments of trade balances on interest rates is am-
biguous. Because the trade balance is the nega-
tive of the capital account, a larger trade bal-
ance is associated with a smaller balance on
capital account. A larger trade balance and a
smaller balance on the capital account can be
associated with either a decrease in the supply
of foreign funds to the United States or a
decrease in the demand for funds in the United
States. A decrease in the supply of funds would
be associated with an increase in interest rates
current one-day rate also can increase because of in-
tertemporal substitution.
“See Fama (1982).
13There is evidence of positive autocorrelation in the data.
Over the sample period used in this paper, the first six
values of the autocorrelation function are 0.85, 0.85, 0.83,
0.80, 0.76 and 0.75.
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in the United States.’4 A decrease in demand
would be associated with a decrease in interest
rates in the United States. Given these two
possibilities and no ancillary evidence to support
either, the hypothesized effect on nominal inter-
est rates of an unexpected increase in the trade
deficit is uncertain.
THE DATA
Daily interest rates on three-month Treasury
bills and 30-year Treasury bonds are used in
our empirical analysis. These rates are closing
quotes supplied by the New York Federal
Reserve, calculated as averages of rates re-
ported by primary government security dealers
between 3:15 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Stan-
dard Time. The changes in rates are measured
as the difference between the interest rate from
one day’s close to the next.”
To estimate the unexpected part of the an-
nounced values of the economic series, we use
the initial announced values of the series minus
the median response from the survey conducted
by MMS International.b6 This widely used sur-
vey polls approximately 50 to 60 government
securities dealers weekly, asking them to indi-
cate their expectation of the change in the nar-
row money stock (Ml). At most a week before
an announcement of several other economic
series, the survey participants also are asked to
indicate their forecasts of the change in other
series, such as the Consumer Price Index.
In this study, we use the survey forecasts for
Ml, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Pro-
ducer Price Index (PPI), the industrial produc-
tion index, the unemployment rate and the
trade balance, Because the survey forecasts of
the price indexes and industrial production are
all measured in terms of monthly percentage
changes, the unexpected part of the announced
values also are measured as a monthly percen-
tage change. The actual and the forecasted un-
employment rates are both measured as percen-
tages of the number of unemployed relative to
the labor force. The forecasts of Ml and the
trade balance are stated in terms of their dollar
values. We measure the unexpected part of
these variables as the percentage difference be-
tween actual and forecasted values relative to
the actual values.
Although other economic variables obviously
might be included in this analysis, the series us-
ed in this study represent a broad range of
economic activity, reflecting changes in infla-
tion, real activity and foreign trade. Moreover,
the variances of changes in the Treasury bill
rate and the Treasury bond rate are greater on
the days with these announcements than on
other days.”
To abstract from the effects of intervening an-
nouncements, we include in our regressions
changes in interest rates only for those days on
which these announcements occur. Since past
intervening announcements are prior informa-
tion and, under rational expectations, are uncor-
related with the current unexpected change,
this restriction does not bias our analysis. A
future unexpected change in a variable will be
currently unknown and, under rational expecta-
tions, also would be uncorrelated with the cur-
rent unexpected change.”
Means and standard deviations of the unex-
pected changes in Ml, the price indexes, in-
dustrial production, the unemployment rate and
the trade balance are presented in table 1.”
‘4We assume that the United States is not small relative to
the rest of the world.
“The three-month Treasury bill rate is measured using the
standard discount interest rate formula. The bond rate is
the yield to maturity.
1OMM$ International and Douglas K. Pearce provided
several of the series examined here. Actual changes in the
series are taken from relevant government and Federal
Reserve publications.
“The F-statistic for testing the hypothesis that the variance
of the change in the Treasury bill rate is the same on days
with these announcements and days without these an-
nouncements is 1.86 with 679 and 1292 degrees of
freedom, which has a marginal significance level of less
than 0.001. The F-statistic for testing this hypothesis using
the variance of the change in the Treasury bond rate is
1.43, also with 679 and 1292 degrees of freedom and a
marginal significance level less than 0.001 -
“This and the prior statement assume that the forecasts are
essentially the same as rational expectations. It is, of
course, true that our estimated coefficients can be affected
by other events on the same day that are correlated with
excluded variables.
19There are 95 months used in table 1. There are only 94
observations for the unexpected change in the CPI,
because the survey value is missing for the announcement
in January 1986. There are 94 observations on the unex-
pected change in unemployment, because the Treasury
bill rate is not available for April 5, 1985, when the
unemployment rate was announced. Therefore, we do not
use this observation. Finally, 93 observations are used for
the trade balance, because only 11 values were announc-
ed in 1987: and two values were announced on the same
day in April 1987. We use just the announcement for the
more recent month, March.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics on
Measures of the Unexpected Part
of Announcements (February 1980 to
December 1987)
Standard Number of
Variable Mean deviation observations
Narrow money
stock 0 08%- 46% 376
Consumer
price index —001 20 94
Producer
pnce index -0.10 34 95
Unemployment
rate 001 21 94
Industrial
production —0 03 .39 95
Trade balance 1318 9823 93
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used to estimate the unexpected parts of the
series being announced.’°
An issue that generally is not dealt with when
using these data is the fact that the measure-
ment of the expected and actual changes in
some of the variables is only in increments of
0.1. That is, forecasts and actual values for the
CPI, the PPI and the industt’ial production index
are all collected as monthly percentage changes
with only one digit after the decimal point. Be-
cause there is a relatively small range of fore-
cast errors at this level of precision, there are a
limited number of values that the forecast er-
rors actually take. Even so, the information in
table I indicates that there is sufficient variation
to estimate a meaningful relationship between
these data and changes in interest rates.’1
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The period used in our analysis runs from
February 1980 through December 1987. The
beginning of the period is dictated by the lack
of survey forecasts of the trade balance prior to
that time. The end of the period is dictated by
data availability. The vector of observations for
each right-hand-side variable includes zeros for
those days when a series is not announced.
Regressions by Year
Previous analyses generally estimate equation
I over all of the available data and for periods
corresponding to changes in the Federal Re-
serve’s operating procedures.” Because we are
concerned with the pattern of the coefficient
estimates on money and other variables over
time, we ignore these particular periods and
estimate equation 1 for the full period and for
each year. Because we have no a priori informa-
tion that dictates the correct periods, this ap-
proach allows us to gauge the effects of the
“For other analyses of this data, see, among others, Pearce
and Roley (1985).
“For example, the forecast errors for the CPI measure of
the inflation rate range in increments of 0.1 from -0.6 to
0.5. The modal error is zero, and the forecast errors are
dispersed around this value, not (as would be possible) vir-
tually always .1 or .2 in absolute value. Similar comments
apply to the PPI and the industrial production index. The
forecast errors of the unemployment rate, also measured
to a precision of 0.1 percentage points, range from -0.5 to
0.7 by increments of 0.1.
22As noted above, previous researchers generally delineate
sample periods by changes in monetary policy operating
procedures. These include the October 6, 1979, shift away
from emphasizing the behavior of the federal funds rate
and placing more importance on the behavior of the
monetary aggregates and the October 1982 shift back to
interest rates. While statistical tests generally do not reject
the use of these breakpoints, it has been questioned
whether the procedures used are adequate to reject the a
priori break point being tested. That is, if October 6, 1979,
is not the true breakpoint in the relationship but another
relatively close date is, the test procedures used will not
reject October 6 as the break. Indeed, evidence presented
in Hafer and Sheehan (1989), based on time-varying
parameter estimates, indicates that the often-used October
1979 and October 1982 sample breaks are not consistent
with the data.
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unexpected parts in the announcements over
time. While the choice of a year is admittedly
arbitrary, it is long enough that some precision
in the regression coefficients is possible but
short enough that it is unlikely to miss an esti-
mable transitory change in the coefficients.”
The regression results are reported in table 2
for the change in the Treasury bill rate.’4 Based
on a5percent marginal significance level, only
unexpected money (UM1) has a statistically sig-
nificant coefficient in the full-period regressions.
This result does not mean, however, that other
economic variables do not influence Treasury
bill rate changes during the period. On the con-
trary, the annual regression results indicate that
unexpected unemployment (UU) is marginally
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for
1983. It also appears that unexpected changes in
the industrial production index (UIP) are associ-
ated with increases in the short-term interest
rate in 1985 and 1986. In none of the annual
regressions, however, do unexpected changes in
the Consumer Price Index (UCPI), the Producer
Price Index (UPPI) or the trade balance (UTB)
have statistically significant coefficients.
The regressions using the change in the 30-
year Treasury bond rate are presented in table
3. The regression for the full period again has a
statistically significant estimated coefficient for
the unexpected part of Ml. The magnitude of
23It is possible, of course, that the estimated coefficients
change with each announcement. Without the imposition
of constraints on the way that the coefficients change,
however, such a specification is not estimable. Our regres-
sion coefficients can be interpreted as estimates of the
average coefficient in a given year.
‘4Again note that the estimation uses only unexpected
changes in the variables. Since correlations between the
expected and unexpected values reveal that the two series
are uncorrelated, omitting the expected values does not
bias the estimated regression coefficients.
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the estimated coefficient is less than one-half
that of the short-term Treasury bill rate, a re-
sult that is consistent with previous work” In
addition to money announcements, the full-
period regression suggests that unexpected
changes in the PPI have a positive and statistic-
ally significant effect on the change in the
Treasury bond rate.
Except for 1980, however, the separate annual
results provide little evidence that the unex-
pected changes in these economic variables
have much effect on changes in the long-term
interest rate. In the results for 1980, unexpec-
ted money and inflation measured by the PPI
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The coefficient on industrial production is signi-
ficant at the 5 percent level in 1987. Note, how-
ever, that the sign of this estimated coefficient
(negative) is incorrect. The estimated coefficient
for the unexpected part of the trade balance is
significant at the 6 percent marginal significance
level in 1987. Interestingly, while the coefficient
often is negative, it is positive for 1987. For the
other years, the estimation results are consis-
tent with the proposition that unexpected parts
of announcements of variables besides money
have little effect on the change in the 30-year
rate.
Stability Tests
An important aspect of the regression results
in tables 2 and 3 is the variability in the estim-
ated coefficients over time. For example, con-
sider the magnitude of the estimated coeffici-
ents on unexpected money from 1980 to 1987
in table 2. Based on the annual regression re-
sults, the estimated coefficient peaks at 0.35 in
1981 and declines to essentially zero in 1987.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
unexpected changes in the money stock are
associated with changes in interest rates early
in the period but not recently.
‘5For example, see Cornell (1983).
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To investigate whether the estimated coeffi-
cients from the various years are statistically
different, two tests are conducted. One test
determines whether the coefficients for each
variable change over time. We test whether
each variable’s coefficients are equal from 1980
to 1987. The results of these tests, regardless of
the interest rate used, are consistent with the
hypothesis that only the coefficients on unex-
pected money vary across years. The F-statistic
for unexpected money when the change in the
Treasury bill rate is used is 4.48. The result us-
ing the Treasury bond rate is an F-statistic of
2.68. Both are statistically significant at less than
the 1 percent marginal significance level.b6 The
F-statistics for the remaining variables are in-
significant: they almost never even exceed
unity.’~
While this test has reasonable power against
the alternative hypothesis that the coefficients
are nonzero and change over several of the
years, it generally has low power against the
alternative that a variable has a nonzero coeffi-
cient for a relatively short period such as one
year. Consequently, testing the coefficients over
single years is a useful additional test.
Testing the hypothesis that a coefficient in
any single year is the same as in the remainder
of the years provides at most marginal evidence
of coefficient instability across the period.’8 Us-
ing a S percent marginal significance level, tests
using the Treasury bill regressions indicate that
the coefficient on the unexpected part of the
trade balance in 1980 is statistically different
from the coefficients in the rest of the period:
the estimated t-statistic is —2.33.’°With the ex-
ception of unexpected money, each of the other
coefficients for the Treasury bill rate is equal
over time. Besides unexpected money, only the
unexpected part of the industrial production in-
dex in 1980 has a coefficient for the Treasury
bond rate that is statistically different from the
remaining years (t = 2.30).
These test results are largely consistent with
the hypothesis that the response of interest
rates to unexpected changes in the variables
other than money are constant and equal to
zero.
Rolling Regression Estimates
Breaking the eight years into annual segments
to estimate the changes in the coefficients over
time may obscure changes that occur during
the years. To investigate the evolution of the es-
timated coefficients, it is worthwhile to examine
the coefficients in a relatively unrestricted man-
ner. This can be done by estimating regressions
that roll through the sample. Equation 1 is esti-
mated for successive 12-month periods, adding a
month and dropping a month as the estimation
of the regression coefficients rolls through the
full period.” The first 12-month period begins
in February 1980 and ends in January 1981; the
last sample ends with December 1987. While us-
ing a 12-month period for the rolling regres-
sions still has an arbitrary element, the
estimated coefficients for any 12-month period
are readily available and can be examined.”
To show how the estimated coefficients have
evolved over the period, the estimated coeffi-
cients for both the Treasury bill and Treasury
bond rates are plotted in figure 1. In interpret-
ing these plots, it is important to note that, be-
2 The results from a standard F-test are consistent with the
null hypothesis of overall coefficient stability. In this test,
each variable including the constant is allowed to take dif-
ferent values for each year. This unrestricted equation is
compared with the equation where all estimates are fixed
for the full period. The calculated F-statistic for changes in
the Treasury bill rate is 1.24. When the change in the
Treasury bond rate is used, the F-statistic is 1.06. Both of
these values are less than the 5 percent critical value.
Such a test, however, may mask changes in one or two
variables’ coefficients. Given the number of variables and
time periods, changes in the estimated coefficient for
some variable can be swamped by the stability of the
others.
‘7Using the change in the Treasury bill rate, the variables
and corresponding F-statistic are: CPI (0.08); PPI (0.95);
unemployment (0.64); industrial production (0.61); and
trade balance (0.85). Using the change in the Treasury
bond rate, the F-statistics are: CPI (0.25); PPI (1.08);
unemployment (0.36); industrial production (1.24); and
trade balance (0.98).
‘~Thistest is first run with the coefficients of all other
variables allowed to be different, then with the coefficients
of all the other variables besides money set equal for all of
the years. In the text, we report the results with the coeffi-
cients of other variables besides money set equal to each
other for all of the years. The results with other coeffi-
cients allowed to vary are little different than those
discussed.
~ the multiple tests across variables and years, there
are good reasons to use a smaller significance level. If
one desires an overall 5 percent significance level for all
the tests combined, the correct significance level for
testing the stability of the coefficients for each year and
each variable is about one-tenth of 1 percent.
‘°Loeys (1985) examines the effects of unexpected money
on interest rates in a similar manner.
‘1We also estimated the rolling regressions using successive
18-month periods. There are only minor changes in the
results.
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Panel A
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
Ml for the 3-Month Treasury Bill
42
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
Ml for the 30-Year Treasury Bond
NOTE: A dashed line indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
CPI for the 30-Year Treasury Bond
1991 92 99 94 95 ‘9 ~997
Panel B
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of





The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
PPI for the 3-Month Treasury Bill
-2
-3
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
PPI for the 30-Year Treasury Bond
19S~ 92 63 66 65 66 997 1861 62 63 64 65 66 997
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-Panel D
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
The Unemployment Rate for the Treasury Bill
Panel E
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
Industrial Production for the 3-Month Treasury Bill
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
The Unemployment Rate for the Treasury Bond
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
Industrial Production for the 30-Year Treasury Bond
Panel F
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
The Trade Balance for the 3-Month Treasury Bill
5691 92 53 94 65 65 5997
1995 55 5997 9661 62 63 94 65 65 5987
The Coefficients of the Unexpected Component of
the Trade Balance for the 30-Year Treasury Bond
5985 62 63 54 65 ‘5 ~967 1565 62 63 94 65 56 5967
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cause common observations in regressions are
separated by less than 12 months, the estimated
regression coefficients within a 12-month period
are not independent. This implies that some
smoothness in the plotted variation of the coef-
ficient estimates is to be expected even if all
estimated coefficients are zero and any varia-
tion is random.
in addition, the coefficient estimates for the
two interest rates are not statistically indepen-
dent. The simple correlation of the change in
the bill rate and the bond rate is 0.658 for 1980
through 1987 on days with announcements, a
correlation that is statistically significant at the
S percent level. This means that, if the
estimated coefficient of industrial production,
for instance, increases in the regression for the
bill rate, the estimated coefficient of industrial
production in the regression for the bond rate
is likely to increase as well, even if the increase
is due to random variation. Despite these
caveats, these estimates are useful because they
make it possible to examine the inter-year
changes in the estimates for all possible dates.
Panel a of figure 1 shows the estimated coeffi-
cients on unexpected changes in Ml.” The esti-
mated coefficients in the regression for the bill
rate and the bond rate track each other with a
larger estimated coefficient for the bill rate until
1984, when the estimated coefficients converge
to zero. Finding that the effect of unexpected
money on changes in the interest rate becomes
smaller after the shift in the Federal Reserve’s
operating procedure in late 1982 is consistent
with previous work.’~
Panels b and c show the estimated coefficients
of unexpected increases in the inflation rate as
measured by the CPI and the PPI. In the regres-
sions for the Treasury bill rate, not one esti-
mated coefficient is statistically significant for
any 12-month period using a5percent marginal
significance level. In the regressions for the
Treasury bond rate, only estimated coefficients
for the PPI in nine months in 1981 and three
months in 1984 are statistically significant using
a standard 5 percent marginal significance level.
There is no evidence that the unexpected part
of announcements of the CPI affect interest
rates for any period as long as 12 months from
1980 to 1987. One interpretation consistent with
these regression results is that there is some
evidence of a relationship between the unex-
pected part of inflation as measured by the Pro-
ducer Price Index in 1980, but little afterwards.
Such an interpretation requires that the point
estimates of the regression coefficients be view-
ed as indications that the unexpected parts of
the announcements had stronger implications
for inflation over a period longer than the
three-month maturity of the Treasury bill rate.
Real activity is represented by the unemploy-
ment rate (an inverse indicator) and industrial
production. The estimated coefficients of the
unemployment rate are presented in panel d. In
the regressions for the Treasury bill rate, the
coefficient of the unemployment rate is negative
and statistically significant at the 5 percent
marginal significance level during late 1983 and
early 1984. While the estimated coefficient for
the bond rate is not statistically significant dur-
ing this period, the negative and smaller (in
magnitude) coefficient is consistent with the
hypothesis that the unexpected part of an-
nouncements of the unemployment rate affect
interest rates in this period. The estimated coef-
ficients for industrial production (panel e) also
provides some evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that announcements of it have af-
fected interest rates. In particular, from
mid-1985 through much of 1986, the Treasury
bill and bond rates both have sharply increasing
estimated coefficients on unexpected increases
in industrial production. For the Treasury bill
rate equations, these coefficients are significant
at the 5 percent level. The positive sign is con-
sistent with a rationalization in terms of
monetary policy, with higher growth being
followed by expectations of relatively contrac-
tionary monetary policy, and in terms of ex-
pected higher future growth signaling higher
real interest rates.
Finally, the estimated coefficients for the trade
balance, shown in panel f, never provide much
support for a systematic relationship except per-
haps at the start of the sample. Not one of the
168 estimated coefficients in the regressions for
the bill and bond rates is statistically significant
using a5percent marginal significance level.
CONCLUSION
How do financial markets respond to the
unexpected part of announcements of govern-
‘2Dashed lines denote statistical significance at standard 5
percent marginal significance level.
“See, for example, Hardouvelis (1987) and Hafer and
Sheehan (1989).
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ment statistics? Based on the evidence presented
in this article, the answer is, very little. Using
regression analysis, statistical tests of coefficient
stability and rolling regressions to detect coeffi-
cient variability from 1980 to 1987, we find that
only the unexpected changes in the money
stock have a systematic effect on interest rates.
Even then, it appears that the significant effects
peter out by late 1982.
For none of the other variables examined do
we find evidence of a reliable effect on interest
rates over the period. This set of variables in-
cludes measures of inflation, real economic acti-
vity and foreign trade. Failing to find any sys-
tematic relationship between interest rate
changes and these non-monetary variables has
two implications. One is that explanations of the
response of interest rates to monetary an-
nouncements that emphasize changes in econ-
omic agents’ expectations of future inflation and
real economic activity may be off the mark for
1980 through 1982. If these explanations were
correct, such effects should be evident when in-
flation and real variables themselves are used.
Our results, however, reveal little effect from
the unemployment rate or industrial production.
Theories that are premised on the response of
interest rates to expected changes in monetary
policy are more consistent with our empirical
results.
The other implication concerns the effect on
interest rates perceived by financial market
analysts when government statistics are an-
nounced. We find no consistent response of in-
terest rates, either short term or long term, to
unexpected changes in the different non-mone-
tary variables. We do find evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that the unexpected parts
of announcements of the Producer Price Index
in 1980, the unemployment rate in 1983 and in-
dustrial production in 1980, 1985 and 1986 are
associated with changes in interest rates. The
relative infrequency of these significant effects
can be interpreted in one of two ways. The
first is that, of the 80 estimated annual coeffi-
cients, it is hardly surprising that five are
statistically significant at the 5 percent marginal
significance level. A conclusion that all of the
coefficients are zero is therefore consistent with
the results. The second is that, except for an-
nouncements of the money stock in the early
1980s, responses of interest rates to an-
nouncements are episodic, short-lived affairs.
REFERENCES
Belongia, Michael t, R. W. Hafer, and Richard G. Sheehan.
“On the Temporal Stability of the Interest Rate-Weekly
Money Relationship:’ Review of Economics and Statistics
(August 1988), pp. 516-20. _______ - “A Note on the Temporal Stability of the In-
terest Rate-Weekly Money Relationship,” Working Paper
86-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (1986).
Belongia, Michael T., and Richard G. Sheehan. “The Infor-
mational Efficiencyof Weekly Money Announcements: An
Econometric Critique:’ Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics (July 1987), pp. 351-56.
Campbell, John Y., and Robert J. Shiller. “Cointegration and
Tests of Present Value Models,” Journal ofPolitical
Economy (October 1987), pp. 1062-88.
Clark, Truman A., Douglas H. Joines, and 0. Michael
Phillips. “Social Security Payments, Money Supply An-
nouncements, and Interest Rates:’ Journal ofMonetary
Economics (September 1988), pp. 257-78.
Cornell, Bradford. “The Money Supply Announcements Puz-
zle: Review and Interpretation:’ American Economic Review
(September 1983), pp. 644-57.
Fama, Eugene F. “Inflation, Output, and Money,” Journal of
Business (April 1982), pp. 201-32.
Flavin, Marjorie. “Time Series Evidence on the Expectations
Hypothesis of the Term Structure’ in Karl Brunner and
Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Monetary and Fiscal Policies and
Their Applications, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, Volume 20 (Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1984).
Gilbert, R. Alton, “Operating Procedures for Conducting
Monetary Policy:’ this Review (February 1985), pp. 13-21.
Hater, R. W. “Comparing Time-Series and Survey Forecasts
of Weekly Changes in Money: A Methodological Note:’
Journal ofFinance (September 1984), pp. 1207-la
Hafer, R.W., and Richard 0. Sheehan. ‘On the Response of
Interest Rates to Unexpected Weekly Money: Are Policy
Changes Important?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Research Paper 87-005 (revised, February 1989).
Hardouvelis, Gikas A. “Macroeconomic Information and
Stock Prices’ Journalof Economics and Business (May
1987), pp. 131-40.
Hem, Scott E. “The Response of Short-Term Interest Rates
to Weekly Money Announcements: A Comment:’ Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking (May 1985), pp. 264-71.
LeRoy, Stephen F. “Expectations Models of Asset Prices: A
Survey’ Journal ofFinance (March 1982), pp. 185-217.
Loeys, Jan 0. “Changing Interest Rate Responses to Money
Announcements: 1977-83:’ Journal of Monetary Economics
(May 1985), pp. 323-32.
Pearce, Douglas K., and V. Vance Roley. “Stock Prices and
Economic News:’ Journal of Business (January 1985), pp.
49-67.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS46
Sease, Douglas R. “Trade Deficit’s Impact Declines Despite Sims, Christopher A. “Martingale-like Behavior of Prices and
Jitters,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1989. Interest Rates,” University of Minnesota Center for Eco-
nomic Research Discussion Paper No. 205.
Sheehan, Richard G. ‘Weekly Money Announcements: New Thornton, Daniel L. “Why Do Market Interest Rates Respond
Information and Its Effects:’ this Review (AugustlSeptember to Money Announcements?” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
1985), pp. 25-34. Louis Research Paper No. 88-002, 1988.
_______ “The Borrowed-Reserves Operating Procedure:
Shiller, Robert J., John Y. Campbell, and Kermit L. Theory and Evidence:’ this Review (January/February
Schoenholtz. “Forward Rates and Future Policy: Inter- 1988), pp. 30-54.
preting the Term Structure of Interest Rates,” Brookings Wallace, Anise C. “The Numbers that Move the Market,”
Papers on Economic Activity (1: 1983), pp. 173-217. New York Times, June 5, 1988.
MARCH/APR1L 1989